Nationalism vs. democracy : China’s bloggers and the Western media by Herold, DK
PUBLISHED AS: 
Herold, D. K. (2010). Nationalism vs. Democracy – China’s bloggers and 
the Western Media. In S. Yao, W. Bin, S. Morgan & D. Sutherland 
(Eds.), Sustainable Reform and Development in Post-Olympic China 
(pp. 171-189). London and New York: Routledge. 
 
 
Title: ‘Nationalism vs. Democracy - China’s bloggers and the Western Media’ 
Names: Dr. David K. Herold 
Affiliation(s) 
Herold - Department of Applied Social Sciences (APSS), the Hong Kong 
Polytechnic University, HK 
 
Contact details:  
Herold: Department of Applied Social Sciences (APSS), the Hong Kong 
Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Kowloon, HK 
T: +852 (0) 3400 3015 
E-mail address: ssherold@polyu.edu.hk  
 
This is the Pre-Published Version.
2 
 
Chapter 11 Nationalism vs. Democracy - China’s bloggers and the 
Western Media 
 
Abstract: Over 300 Million Chinese access the Internet regularly. While these 
netizens (Internet + citizens) have often been portrayed as a potential force for 
democracy, this changed with the unrest in Tibet, and the run-up to the Beijing 
Olympics in 2008. As this chapter shows, many Chinese netizens began to 
defend China’s honour against the perceived betrayal and attacks by the 
Western media. They began to see democracy and the protection of Chinese 
interests as polar opposites as Western comments on China damaged 
democracy’s reputation among the upwardly mobile, emerging Middle Class 
active in Chinese cyberspace. 
Keywords: Western Media, Chinese cyberspace, democracy, nationalism 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
2008 was a year that carried many Chinese hopes for a brighter future for China, 
and for more respect for China from other countries. Chinese netizens in 
particular expected China to open up more and to allow them unrestricted 
access to those parts of the world-wide web that had so far only been accessible 
through Internet proxies from within China. Outside China, many expected an 
opening-up of China as well. Editorials in Western newspapers suggested that 
the Olympics would contribute to irreversible political change in China that 
would ultimately lead to free and multi-party elections. 
 
 
To the contrary, both Chinese netizens and others discovered that there was an 
unbridgeable chasm between their views on China’s current situation. Many in 
Europe and America thought of China as a country firmly under the control of 
an oppressive and hated Communist regime, whose ‘subjects’ were trying to 
duplicate the wave of revolutions against totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe 
during the late 1980s and the 1990s. They thought that the Beijing Olympics 
would provide a stage for a grass-roots movement to emerge from hiding and – 
with the support of Western politicians and the Western media present at the 
Olympic games – push for human rights and democratic changes in China (see 
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e.g. Miles December 2007; Spiegel Online 8 August 2007; Tisdall 15 October 
2007; Watts 14 October 2007). 
 
 
China’s netizens had very different expectations for the Beijing Olympics, and 
far less of a desire to start a revolution. China’s Internet users were interested in 
more freedom – but only on the Internet. They wanted their voices to be heard 
and respected, not censored – but only on the Internet. In general, China’s 
netizens showed that they were proud of China and its achievements over the 
past 30 years, and that they supported the Chinese government as the agent of 
reforms behind China’s economic development. 
 
 
CHINESE CYBERSPACE – A BRIEF BACKGROUND 
 
The Internet in the People’s Republic of China – A brief background 
 
The Internet in China emerged a few years after the Internet in Europe and 
America, and its structures and set up reflected the different settings under 
which it emerged. (For more details on the history of China’s Internet see 
CNNIC 2008). 
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Four organizations were set up by the central government to provide Internet 
access in China: the China Education and Research Network (CERNET) and 
the China Science and Technology Network (CSTNet), both of which were set 
up for academic and research institutions, and ChinaNET, as well as the China 
Golden Bridge Network (ChinaGBN) to provide commercial Internet access. 
The first Internet Café opened in China 15 November 1996 (CNNIC 2003), and 
the general public was allowed to connect privately to the Internet for the first 
time in early 1997, but had to use the already established networks instead of 
creating competing private initiatives. This has had the effect that China’s 
netizens are only able to access and use spaces that the government or 
government-controlled institutions have established and still exercise control 
over. 
 
 
The state or state-controlled entities own the physical backbone of the Internet 
in China, including the limited number of connections between the Chinese and 
the worldwide Internet, and so the central government can exercise greater 
control over Chinese cyberspace than most other governments can over the 
Internet their citizens access. The government in China is not so much trying to 
restrict their citizens’ access to the Internet, but implicitly or explicitly allowing 
everything that goes on in Chinese cyberspace. The relative freedom Chinese 
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netizens enjoy in cyberspace is a freedom ultimately granted to them by the 
central government or its agencies, although often more from a laissez-faire 
attitude than from a decision to grant them more freedom. 
 
 
The Chinese Central government’s attention focuses on content that is judged to 
be harmful to Chinese society, e.g. pornography, religion, political activism, 
and ethnic separatism, etc. These types of content suffer under close scrutiny 
and periodic government crackdowns. The emphasis of the Chinese State is not 
laws and regulations, but instead co-option of netizens through self-regulation 
and self-discipline. 
 
 
Since 1997, state-run and state-controlled institutions have repeatedly called on 
Internet users to exercise self-discipline. When pushed, the central government 
has shut down those parts of the Chinese Internet that displease China’s leaders 
very quickly. Such interventions are the exception rather than the rule, though. 
 
 
Even the ‘Great Fire-Wall of China’ (GFW) presents itself to the user not as an 
inflexible and clearly defined barrier, but instead as a multi-faceted and ever-
changing system of highly localized rules. The only ‘national’ rule is that 
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access to websites outside China is relatively slow when compared to websites 
inside China, which is the result of the limited number of connections between 
Chinese cyberspace and beyond. This technological bottleneck makes frequent 
visits to websites outside China unattractive, which diminishes the interest of 
casual Chinese Internet users in sites perceived to be plagued with a lack of 
speed and frequent time-outs. 
 
 
In addition to the GFW, the Chinese government also employs ‘soft’ barriers 
for Chinese netizens who want to access the Internet, the ISP-enforced 
blacklisting of specific words, or phrases, the coercion of multinational 
technology corporations, and real-world access controls through obligatory 
photo-ID based registration in Internet cafes. None of these barriers are 
insurmountable. Savvy Chinese Internet users and expatriates in China 
regularly avoid them through the use of proxies, web-page-forwarding or 
mirroring. Their value lies more in the deterrence of casual Internet users than 
in the containment of advanced or expert users, which seems good enough for 
the Chinese government (Herold 2008 for more details). 
 
 
Chinese netizens 
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Since 2005, numerous incidents in China’s cyberspace have demonstrated 
growing feelings of community among Chinese Internet users and indicated the 
development and the official acceptance of something like a civil society in 
China’s cyberspace. This virtual civil society has repeatedly caused 
disturbances in the real world and in the willingness of Chinese netizens to 
criticise the government and those developments in Chinese society they 
disagree with. 
 
 
Events that disturbed both online and offline China were e.g. the charges of 
infidelity a World of Warcraft gamer posted against his wife in April 2006 (Fox 
Knight 2006; French 2006), the uncovering of slavery in brick-making factories 
in 2007 (Watts 2007; Associated Press 2007), the story of ‘Beijing Boy’ in 
2007 (Soong November 2007; Agence France Presse 29 May 2007; Zhang 30 
May 2007), and many more. Each of these events demonstrated the willingness 
of Chinese netizens to discuss societal and political problems in Cyberspace 
and their ability to mobilise enough support that the government acceded to 
their demands. The Chinese government has displayed a surprising degree of 
permissiveness towards these online debates in China, although they do shut 
down any debates that openly discuss politically sensitive topics. Netizens have 
been able to continue their discussions through the use of euphemisms and code 
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words, which again demonstrated the lax character of official Chinese controls 
of the Internet. 
 
 
Netizens have been permitted to organise themselves, to discuss problems they 
have with the government or government policies, and to attack and persecute 
others both online and in the real world through the use of the infamous 
‘Human flesh search engines’ (Renrou sousu). From the treatment different 
groups of netizens have received over the past years, online dissent has to be 
coupled with outspoken activism offline, before the authorities intervene, arrest 
people, and order the shutdown of sites. 
 
 
As Hartford (2005) has shown in an article about the electronic mailboxes of 
the mayors of Hangzhou and Nanjing, parts of the Chinese government have 
even used the Internet to interact with ordinary people in China. The response 
of Chinese netizens has shown that there is a willingness of Chinese cyberspace 
to engage with government officials and a trust in the government, despite the 
history of the past 50 years (See also Guo 2007; Tang 10 July 2008; Yang 
2003). 
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China’s netizens have shown themselves to be patriotic and supportive of China 
and its future development. Any grass-roots movement that fights for 
democracy in China is unlikely to develop as long as the Communist party 
manages to improve the objective conditions and the subjectively felt and 
perceived state of the Chinese economy (MacKinnon 2008). China’s netizens 
approve of the strengthening of China, which means they approve of the 
Chinese Communist Party provided it improves the country domestically and 
on the international stage. This might explain the willingness of state officials 
to allow Internet users the freedom they currently enjoy. 
 
 
One issue Chinese netizens do complain about is any form of corruption and 
censorship in Chinese cyberspace, often using materials published on European 
or US news web sites (see e.g. the archive of translated blog posts on Roland 
Soong’s site ‘EastSouthWestNorth’ at 
http://www.zonaeuropa.com/archive.htm). In February 2008, several netizens 
around the former Nanjing University professor Guo Quan attempted to start 
the China Netizen Party (CNP – see Kennedy 8 February 2008). This party was 
immediately shut down and all mention of the CNP eradicated on the Chinese 
Internet. Netizens were not however discouraged from discussing the issues 
raised by the CNP through using codes and hiding the debates inside 
discussions of other topics.  
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However, 2008 was supposed to be the year in which China opened up to the 
world, the year in which the Chinese Internet would be less censored, the year 
of China’s ‘coming-out-party’, and many netizens anticipated great change. 
With people from all over the world coming to China to take part in the Beijing 
Olympics, many expected that the Chinese government would be forced to 
make irreversible changes to the way in which China was governed. Netizens in 
particular seemed to expect easier access to overseas web sites and support for 
their issues from outside China. However, an article by Zhang Heci (27 January 
2008) on Observechina.net had already warned that people outside China had 
very different agendas from those inside China and that even democracy 
activists outside China 
 
 
Do not want to face the reality that is China, with all the huge changes 
in recent years. […] They need to portray China today as the darkest 
and cruellest era. They need to posit that the Chinese people cannot live 
any longer under the brutal rule of the Chinese Communists. 
(Zhang 27 January 2008) 
 
 
12 
 
Tibet exploded on 14 March 2008, and the world sided with the Tibetans 
against China. China’s netizens decided that they had to protect China against 
the treachery and the attacks launched in particular by European and American 
media organisations. 
 
 
BETRAYED RAGE – CHINA’S NETIZENS AND THE WESTERN 
MEDIA 
 
Two angry Chinese youths 
 
A widely-read Chinese blogger by the handle of ‘Hecaitou’ published an entry 
on his blog in March 2008 with the title ‘When Helping becomes Hurting’ 
(Soong March 2008). The post contained several images from Western news 
reports about protests against China that were taking place across Europe 
during the Tibetan unrest in March 2008 and an attack against Western 
‘prejudices against the Chinese people’. He wrote that the European protesters’ 
‘efforts not only provide no material help, but they stir up the nationalistic 
fervour of the Chinese people and let the resulting anger flow and spread 
everywhere.’ 
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Hecaitou accused Westerners of believing that ‘the Chinese have been 
brainwashed’ and that ‘all Chinese are ignorant, undeveloped and close-
minded.’ He insisted that ‘many Chinese people know as much as they do and 
in fact visited a lot more websites than they have.’ After all, young Chinese do 
access a variety of European and American news sources and web sites, and 
also interact with other Chinese netizens in Chinese cyberspace, while only 
very few non-Chinese have the language skills necessary or the desire to access 
Chinese sources. He was full of contempt for the presumed attitudes of 
Europeans and Americans: 
 
 
The westerner stoops down condescendingly to stretch out a helping 
hand to the wretched little yellow men so as to educate and instruct 
them. They are totally oblivious to the possibility that they are dealing 
with live human beings who are thoughtful and sentient. 
(Soong March 2008) 
 
 
While the language is harsh, netizens across Chinese cyberspace agreed fully 
with the sentiments expressed. The young and affluent Chinese who populate 
Chinese cyberspace and who regularly access Western reports on China, felt 
betrayed, hurt, and increasingly furious. Euro-American calls for the freedom of 
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expression and their insistence on the virtue of listening to diverging opinions 
seemed not to apply to them. Chinese opinions were a priori wrong and the 
result of brainwashing by the propaganda-machine of a totalitarian Communist 
regime. 
 
 
In the absence of respect and equality, what is the point of dealing with 
the westerners? Presently, the westerners must be wondering about the 
reaction of the Chinese people to the current events. Once again, they 
treat the unexpected outcome as the result of successful brainwashing or 
overflowing nationalism. But they would never reflect on the 
implications of their actions on the Chinese people. 
(Soong March 2008) 
 
 
The perception of Hecaitou and others, that Westerners treated them with 
contempt and did not acknowledge the legitimacy of their opinions, enraged 
many Chinese netizens and other Chinese people. 
 
 
The Olympic year of 2008 had been anticipated with unrealistic hopes by many 
Chinese as the year during which China would be accepted as an equal by the 
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developed world. However, the contempt and criticism that China’s netizens 
encountered on Western websites during March and April 2008 destroyed such 
hopes. Instead many, including Hecaitou, began to feel furious and saw China 
threatened by an unwarranted and unfair attack: 
 
 
Previously, I did not particularly care about the Olympics because I did 
not feel that it had anything to do with me. But now the Olympics is like 
a pair of testicles that someone else is holding in his hands in a 
threatening manner, but his purpose is not to change the practical 
situation of the Chinese people at all. […] Thanks to their concerns, the 
Chinese people have rallied at an unprecedented speed underneath the 
national flag. They have voluntarily given up many rights and freedoms, 
in order to avoid more injuries and insults from the outside. These 
westerners are not helping their friends. They are only helping to create 
an enemy as well as an Asiatic orphan. 
(Soong March 2008) 
 
 
Although it is tempting to disregard Hecaitou’s comments as just one voice 
among millions of Chinese netizens, he was far from alone in expressing these 
sentiments. His blog entry was copied to many of China’s major bulletin boards 
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and discussed widely. Most Chinese netizens agreed with him. Additionally, it 
would be wrong to dismiss these feelings of Chinese netizens as mere 
ignorance of the diverse and broad mediascape of European and American 
countries. Many thousands of young Chinese at universities and in employment 
in the USA, Canada and Europe are highly media-savvy. These Chinese, living 
abroad were just as upset about the European and American news portrayals of 
China, as their fellow netizens back in China. 
 
 
On 1 April 2008 a Chinese living in Germany with the Internet handle 
‘Schweinsteiger’ posted a long entry on the ChinaRen BBS forum (see Soong 1 
April 2008). In his entry he described the interactions and in some cases 
verbatim conversations with his co-workers in their shared office during March 
2008, beginning before the Tibetan unrest and the following few weeks. The 
entry caused a stir in China, with over 650 replies on the original posting and 
multiple cross-postings of the entry on other web sites. 
 
 
According to the post, his co-workers repeatedly used German news reports in 
their attempts to convince him that the Chinese government was evil. They 
attacked China, the Chinese government, the Chinese Communist Party, and the 
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Chinese people in general, and refused to believe anything reported within 
China. They told him: 
 
 
Your media are lying and what you see is not real! If you want to 
criticize German media, you better go home and criticise your own 
Chinese media first! […] Your television channels are telling lies. What 
right do you have to say that the German media are lying? 
(Soong 1 April 2008) 
 
 
After several days of the poster attempting to set the record on Tibet and China 
straight, his German colleagues tried to strengthen their argument by enlisting 
the help of non-German news sources. These Western news sources supported 
the German version of events in Tibet, although they did not offer any 
additional proof, but instead merely used the same images and sources as the 
German news media. In the end, this led to the following exchange, which 
demonstrates some of the frustration felt by increasing numbers of young 
Chinese when interacting with Westerners: 
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She said: ‘Even this Spanish website is saying that the Chinese 
government is suppressing and killing peaceful demonstrators, etc.’ 
I said: ‘I know. The western media are all lying.’ 
She said: ‘But why is the whole world saying that and only China does 
not say so! Don’t you feel that your government is lying to you? It is 
obvious that your government is the liar! Why else would all the 
countries condemn China?!’ 
I said: ‘Right. All the countries are saying that China is bad, but none of 
them can produce any evidence to support their version. Only the 
Chinese government has produced the evidence. We have the video 
images. Those people were not demonstrating peacefully. They were 
murdering people. None of those video images were shown in the 
western media, which used those fake photos to smear China.’ 
She said: ‘You are showing the fake video images fabricated by the 
Chinese government!’ 
I don’t know what to say to a person like that. 
(Soong 1 April 2008) 
 
 
After recounting the interactions during this time, ‘Schweinsteiger’, the poster, 
summarises what he believes are the main problems for China’s image in 
Germany, and therefore for any Chinese wanting to live or study in Germany: 
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1. The propaganda in the western media has achieved their goals -- the 
German people believe. Not only do they believe, but they believe it 
firmly to the point where all dissident voices are regarded as lies. 
2. The marketing effort by the Dalai Lama over the years has been 
successful beyond expectations. Every German that I come across treats 
him as a ‘great spiritual leader.’ Everything that he says is true and 
everything that he does is correct. 
3. Chinese students in Germany are unpopular. My colleagues indirectly 
reveal those feelings. They even tell me directly: ‘We are really worried 
about what happens if one day you learn what we know.’ 
4. It is a mistake for China to even exist. The faults of China can be 
stacked from the ground to the heavens. Furthermore, under the 
leadership of this demon government, things are getting worse and 
worse. 
5. Bloodshed and massacres occur everywhere in China. When a 
Chinese citizen says the wrong thing, he will be arrested immediately 
and subjected to extreme torture in jail. 
6. China does not have the right to host the Olympics. Anyone who 
attends the Olympics is supportive of genocide to a certain extent. 
(Soong 1 April 2008) 
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He ends his posts with a number of frustrated statements that portray how much 
he feels betrayed by the West in general, and Germany and its news media in 
particular. These sentences echo the betrayal expressed by Hecaitou on his blog 
and are in turn mirrored in many of the comments left on blogs and bulletin 
boards across Chinese cyberspace. However, these sentences also demonstrate 
the growing conviction among young Chinese that China should no longer 
listen to other countries, and should instead focus on growing stronger, so that 
one day it might no longer have to listen to the lies and accusations of the 
Western media and Western governments: 
 
 
Anything good about China must have been fabricated by the Chinese 
government; visual images favourable to China were staged by the 
Chinese government; any photo favourable to China was the result of 
PhotoShop work. […] China is hopeless with no redeemable value. All 
the opposing voices against China are right, and they will support those 
voices. […] I feel that it is a long and endless struggle with them. This 
struggle cannot be resolved through any debate or discussion of facts. 
This can only be done through the construction of the motherland. 
When the motherland is strong, even stronger, they will shut their 
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mouths! Each one of us Chinese overseas students is working hard and 
enduring the suffering. Several decades into the future, will China 
collapse like the Germans hope? Or will China be so strong that they 
will collapse? 
(Soong 1 April 2008) 
 
 
China’s cyberspace declares war on the Western media 
 
The frustrations expressed by individual Chinese netizens like Hecaitou or 
Schweinsteiger grew into a feeling of rage across China’s cyberspace. This rage 
and the desire to take action grew throughout the Tibetan unrest and the 
subsequent disturbances during the Olympic Torch relay in Europe. It led to 
two Internet expressions of anger that challenged Western media organisations 
and served as a call-to-arms for China’s youth. 
 
 
On 15 April 2008, ‘a twenty-eight-year-old graduate student in Shanghai named 
Tang Jie’ (Osnos 28 July 2008) uploaded a short video clip to a video-sharing 
website under the Internet name ‘CTGZ’ entitled ‘2008 China Stand Up!’ The 
video was later also cross-posted to YouTube, and on YouTube alone it was 
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watched 50,000 times and attracted over 1,500 mostly positive comments (see 
clover19862003 17 April 2008 for the video and the comments). 
 
 
It was a homespun documentary, and it opened with a Technicolor 
portrait of Chairman Mao, sunbeams radiating from his head. Out of 
silence came an orchestral piece, thundering with drums, as a black 
screen flashed, in both Chinese and English, one of Mao’s mantras: 
‘Imperialism will never abandon its intention to destroy us.’ Then a cut 
to present-day photographs and news footage, and a fevered sprint 
through conspiracies and betrayals. […] A cut, then, to another front: 
rioters looting stores and brawling in Lhasa, the Tibetan capital. The 
music crescendos as words flash across the scenes: ‘So-called peaceful 
protest!’ A montage of foreign press clippings critical of China – 
nothing but ‘rumours, all speaking with one distorted voice.’ […] 
‘Obviously, there is a scheme behind the scenes to encircle China. […] 
One final act of treachery: in Paris, protesters attempt to wrest the 
Olympic torch from its official carrier, forcing guards to fend them off – 
a ‘long march’ for a new era. The film ends with the image of a Chinese 
flag, aglow in the sunlight, and a solemn promise: ‘We will stand up and 
hold together always as one family in harmony!’  
(Osnos 28 July 2008) 
23 
 
 
 
Evan Osnos managed to track Tang Jie down on behalf of the New Yorker and 
interviewed him about the video and what led to its creation. Similar to 
Hecaitou, Tang Jie had been angered by the events surrounding the Tibetan 
unrest and the protests in Europe, which he had followed on 
 
 
American and European news sites, in addition to China’s official 
media. Like others his age, he has no hesitation about tunnelling under 
the government firewall. […] He is baffled that foreigners might 
imagine that people of his generation are somehow unwise to the 
distortions of censorship. 
(Osnos 28 July 2008) 
 
 
In his view, most young Chinese are very aware of censorship and of the way 
the media report events in China. Instead of seeing this as a disadvantage, 
though, he argued that the awareness of censorship is an advantage young 
people in China have over their peers in Europe and America, as ‘we are always 
asking ourselves whether we are brainwashed. […] But when you are in a so-
called free system you never think about whether you are brainwashed’. The 
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reports Tang Jie was able to access on European and Western websites, 
however, were filled with negative reports and attacks on the Chinese 
government, the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese people who did not rise 
up against the oppressive regime. To Chinese netizens 
 
 
it smacked of a conspiracy. It shocked people like Tang, who put faith 
in the Western press, but, more important, it offended them: Tang 
thought that he was living in the moment of greatest prosperity and 
openness in his country’s modern history, and yet the world still seemed 
to view China with suspicion. […]Like many of his peers, Tang 
couldn’t figure out why foreigners were so agitated about Tibet—an 
impoverished backwater, as he saw it, that China had tried for decades 
to civilize. Boycotting the Beijing Games in the name of Tibet seemed 
as logical to him as shunning the Salt Lake City Olympics to protest 
America’s treatment of the Cherokee. 
(Osnos 28 July 2008) 
 
 
While Osnos attempts to trace Tang Jie’s attitudes back to a general feeling of 
discontent with China’s increasing Westernization, Tang Jie himself, and many 
others like him in China’s cyberspace seem to disagree. What they express is 
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not a fear of the Westernization of China, but instead the belief, based on their 
experience and their perusal of Chinese and Western news sources, 
 
 
that the United States will seek to obstruct China’s rise […]. Disparate 
issues of relatively minor importance to Americans, such as support for 
Taiwan and Washington’s calls to raise the value of the yuan, have 
metastasized in China into a feeling of strategic containment. 
(Osnos 28 July 2008) 
 
 
Echoing the thoughts of many young Chinese, Tang Jie dismissed human rights 
and democracy as unimportant for the moment, while stating that ‘we value all 
the values of human rights, of democracy’ and calling the Tiananmen 
movement of 1989 ‘misguided and naive’. These sentiments disturbed Osnos to 
such an extent that he felt compelled to get a second opinion on Chinese views 
of democracy and the Tiananmen movement from Liu Yang, a Chinese 
studying at Stanford University in the USA. However, this 26-year-old student 
not only agreed with Tang Jie’s sentiments, but argued that ‘if 4 June had 
succeeded, China would be worse and worse, not better.’ Liu Yang concluded 
by stating a common sentiment in today’s China: 
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Liu said that he is not willing to risk all that his generation enjoys at 
home in order to hasten the liberties he has come to know in America. 
‘Do you live on democracy?’ he asked me. ‘You eat bread, you drink 
coffee. All of these are not brought by democracy. Indian guys have 
democracy, and some African countries have democracy, but they can’t 
feed their own people. Chinese people have begun to think, ‘One part is 
the good life, another part is democracy,’ Liu went on. ‘If democracy 
can really give you the good life, that’s good. But, without democracy, 
if we can still have the good life why should we choose democracy?’ 
(Osnos 28 July 2008) 
 
 
The restrictions placed on the Chinese population by the Chinese government 
and the Chinese Communist Party are seen as necessary evils that support 
China’s rapid development. Most of the steps deemed necessary for the 
continued development of China, e.g. a strict birth control system, government 
control of exchange and interest rates, strict investment rules, a flexible 
interpretation of existing laws, etc. would be impossible to maintain in a 
democratic system under a strict rule of law. 
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Tang Jie is not a single, naive, lone, nationalistic young man, and his video not 
just the result of successful brainwashing. His video expressed the thoughts and 
feelings of many young Chinese as the comments on his video and the 
discussions across Chinese cyberspace show. Just how organised, and how 
well-read in Western news sources Chinese netizens are, was shown around the 
same time by the reactions to a new Chinese website at www.anti-cnn.com. 
 
 
During the height of the Tibetan unrest in March 2008, and its attendant media 
frenzy in Europe and America, many Chinese felt that the Western reporting of 
the events left a lot to be desired. Many of the reports about Tibet in the 
Western media contained mistakes and misrepresentations. They portrayed the 
situation as the brutal suppression by the Communist Chinese state of a non-
aggressive, peaceful movement led by Tibetan monks. 
 
 
Rao Jin, 24, the founder of a small technology company in Beijing, said 
he was so angry about what he sees as foreign journalists’ prejudice 
against China that last week he created a Web site, http://www.anti-
cnn.com, to document what he calls mistakes and bias in Western 
media. He said more than 1,000 people have e-mailed, volunteering to 
spot errors.  
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(Drew 24 March 2008) 
 
 
Anti-CNN started in late March 2008 as a single web page with pictures of 
Western news programmes, reports, and web pages, and proof of the mistakes 
they contained (the website has changed since then, but their initial reports have 
been discussed by MacKinnon 26 March 2008; People’s Daily Online, 3 April 
2008; and the entries in Soong, March 2008). By now, Anti-CNN has grown 
into a massive website with original articles, opinion pieces, news reports, 
videos, and a discussion forum which attests to its immense popularity among 
Chinese netizens. The original web page, however, led with a statement that 
expressed Rao Jin’s disgust with Western reporting standards: 
 
 
See the true despicable and shameless face of western media. For a long 
time now, certain western media best represented by CNN and BBC, in 
the name of press freedom have been unscrupulously slandering and 
defaming developing nations. In order to achieve their unspoken goal 
they mislead and they ensnare, switching black for white, confusing 
right and wrong, fabricating…willing to go to any length. In their 
reports on the riots in Tibet Western media’s performance once again 
shows to the world their repulsive true face. 
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(Kennedy 24 March 2008 - also the following quotes) 
 
 
This was followed by a call-to-arms to all Chinese netizens who were asked to 
join in and to track down other falsehoods in Western media reports ‘not 
limited by language, content (text or photos) or country’, as ‘the more evidence 
of their crimes we collect, the more space we’ll have fought and won for 
ourselves.’ The enthusiastic response by Chinese netizens to this call-to-arms 
demonstrated within a few days not only how biased and erroneous Western 
reports about the situation were, but also how well-informed and widely-read 
Chinese netizens were, as well as how angry they were with ‘the West’. 
 
 
Western media organisations had been allowed to get away with such – to the 
Chinese netizens – obvious falsehoods without being penalised for them by 
European or American authorities using laws e.g. against libel or defamation. 
This signalled to most Chinese that the Western media were acting with the 
approval of Western governments, and so the introductory statement closes 
with a wider ‘declaration of war’: 
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This is a struggle of resistance against western hegemonic discourse. 
We need to fully recognize that this will be a long-term, difficult and 
complex battle. But regardless of the outcome, we all firmly believe: 
Western nations’ days of using several of their crap media in an absurd 
attempt to fool people with their rotten words will soon be over for 
good! 
(Kennedy 24 March 2008 - he also uses the phrase ‘declare war’) 
 
 
As Western journalists, expatriates living in China, people going to see the 
Olympic torch relay, people coming to Beijing for the Olympic Games, etc. 
discovered, many young Chinese took this appeal to stand united and to protect 
China against all attacks very seriously. Young Chinese are proud of their 
country, and they do not appreciate the constant criticism and scorn heaped on 
China by Western countries and the Western media. As Schweinsteiger put it in 
his conversation with his colleague: 
 
 
China is developing rapidly now and the western nations are scared and 
uneasy. Therefore, everybody is against China. I have been in Germany 
for two years, and I have not read a single piece of good news about 
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China. China is always wrong in everything that it does. Do you feel that 
such a grand country can do nothing right? 
(Soong 1 April 2008) 
 
 
Reflections on a bad year 
 
Since the end of the Beijing Olympics, Chinese cyberspace became quieter, at 
least in its attacks on Western media organisations, although this might have 
more to do with the much reduced interest in China in Europe and America, 
than with any change in sentiments. Western journalists and Chinese netizens 
have moved to new topics and the misrepresentation of China in non-Chinese 
news reports is no longer a matter of daily debates. 
 
 
These sentiments had not been forgotten. The calm led to calmer reflections of 
the relationship between China and other countries. Two essays, posted online 
in early September, show that the earlier events and passions may have led to a 
much deeper rift between China and Europe or America, and that Western 
concepts such as ‘democracy’ may have been discredited as a result. 
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On 2 September 2008, a Chinese netizen by the name of ‘Mr. Li’ submitted a 
letter of complaint ‘to the Chinese section of the BBC website with the 
challenge to publish it. The BBC did just that. The essay has been re-posted 
widely across Chinese Internet websites’ (Soong 14 September 2008). Mr. Li 
claimed to be a pro-Western Chinese man who had graduated from university 
in 1990 and ‘actively participated in the entire process of the student 
movement’ of 1989. He stated that he used to believe in China’s need for 
democracy and that he used to think that Western media ‘were the only credible 
media that are fair, balanced and truthful’. 
 
 
Mr. Li’s attitude towards Western news media began to change when he spent 
several years in eastern Europe during the 1990s and realised that ‘during the 
four or five years when I could only see the western media, all the reports that I 
saw about China were negative and critical’. He pointed out that this struck him 
as odd as the struggling China that he saw reported in the media was very 
different from the prosperous and fast developing China that he encountered 
during his visits home. During the years that followed his belief that Western 
media were deliberately misrepresenting China in their reports was 
strengthened, such as the reporting on Hong Kong’s return to China as the 
‘Death of Hong Kong’. During 2008, the misrepresentations reached a climax 
and Mr. Li charged that 
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the western media may not realize that they are losing China! They are 
losing the admiration and trust of the young generation of China, 
pushing them towards nationalism. All this occurs because the western 
media do not really understand China and they have no intention of 
really understanding China either. 
(Soong 14 September 2008) 
 
 
Instead of trying to understand China, its people, and its government, Western 
media were projecting East European labels onto China, in the belief ‘that the 
Chinese government is a dictatorial and totalitarian government, which must 
necessarily be unpopular among the people.’ This misunderstanding has led 
Western media to assume that the only truthful voices in China are those of 
dissidents, or ‘overseas political exiles’. 
 
 
Claiming to speak for the ‘middle-class and intelligentsia that came into being’ 
since the reforms in China started in the late 1970s, Mr. Li argued that the 
Chinese ‘want China to go even further with reforms’ and affirmed that ‘they 
basically support the Chinese government’. These reforms were mainly 
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economic reforms at the moment, but even so, it was his belief that ‘democracy 
and the rule of law are the ultimate goals of modernization for China’, even if 
in the present circumstances it was more important for China to ‘maintain a 
strong and powerful central government’. 
 
 
His criticism of Europe and America, and in particular with the Western media 
was that they ‘seem to want democracy for the sake of democracy and they 
don’t care what happens to China after democracy and freedom come’ and he 
accused them of using ‘democracy and freedom as pretexts to divide and 
weaken China’ so that China would not rise up to challenge the current status 
quo, but follow the lead of the former Soviet Union and disintegrate into a 
number of small and largely irrelevant successor states. 
 
 
Following Mr. Li’s essay, the BBC also published comments on the essay by 
several netizens. Almost all of the Chinese commentators agreed with the 
opinions expressed by Mr. Li, while non-Chinese commentators refuse to 
engage with the arguments put forward. They instead attempt to devalue the 
essay and its supporting comments, arguing that ‘many Chinese people are still 
the wrong audience with whom to discuss democracy and freedom.’ Through 
this highly problematic prejudice against the entire essay and the refusal to 
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engage in a constructive debate with its points, Mr. Li’s position is ironically 
supported as it proves that these non-Chinese ‘have no intention of really 
understanding China’. 
 
 
About a week later, on 9 September 2008, another Chinese netizen with the 
handle ‘300 Spartan Heroes’ posted an entry on the popular Tianya bulletin 
board (see Soong 11 September 2008 for a translation and the quotes below) 
with the title ‘How the Western Media Lost the Young Generation in China.’ 
The essay itself repeated many of the accusations against Western media that 
others had written about earlier in the year, but in an interesting twist, the 
article seemed to receive the blessing of the Chinese government through the 
so-called ‘50 cent Party’ (Wu-Mao-Dang), bloggers who are suspected of being 
paid to produce pro-government comments on bulletin boards and blogs in 
Chinese cyberspace (Xiao 28 October 2008). Many of the comments left for the 
essay on Tianya were too supportive and positive, while also praising the 
quality of CCTV programming or the accuracy of Chinese news reporting. 
Other commentators pointed to the ludicrousness of such statements and the 
debate in the comments soon evolved into a debate about the existence of the 
‘50 cent party’ instead of talking about the originally posted essay (Pan 14 
September 2008). 
 
36 
 
 
Nevertheless the original essay raised a number of important points in the 
debate between Chinese netizens and the Western media. It should not be 
ignored, particularly as it attempted to move beyond even Mr. Li’s letter to the 
BBC to provide an analysis of the process by which the Western media ‘lost’ 
the Chinese youth instead of merely accusing them of wrongdoing. 
 
 
The main premise of the essay was that ‘Western nations’ are intent on 
‘promoting their values’ through the ‘hard methods’ of waging wars (in 
Afghanistan and Iraq) and the ‘soft methods’ of the ‘Western media using their 
international speech rights to say awful things about countries which do not 
have Western-style democracy. […] The Western media are very good at that 
and they can pull these types of reports out of thin air.’ While Europeans and 
Americans tend to see ‘the government’, ‘the media’, and ‘the public’ as 
separate and as having different beliefs and agendas, for the author of this 
essay, there is a highly apparent continuity between non-Chinese attitudes 
towards, and statements about, China and the Chinese people. This continuity 
was based on the monopoly the Western media has held over information about 
China, but has recently begun to be undermined through the increase in the 
number of people travelling from or to China. 
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If there are no western tourists coming to China and no Chinese 
studying overseas, the western media could say whatever they want and 
they own the international speech rights. If you cannot see for yourself, 
you have to trust them. But times are different, as more and more 
western visitors come to China and more and more Chinese tourists 
travel overseas. […]The western tourists are perplexed because China is 
completely unlike what their own media are reporting. The overseas 
Chinese students are perplexed because very few western media reports 
have anything good to say about China. […] Those who have seen the 
real China realized that they had been deceived by the western media. 
(Soong 14 September 2008) 
 
 
The author ‘300 Spartan Heroes’ continued his essay by arguing that this 
discrepancy between the experienced reality of China and the reports in the 
Western media have had an especially damaging impact on China’s new middle 
class and on intellectuals, the two main groups supporting (and driving) the 
development of China – and the ones who profit the most from the continuing 
economic development. 
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Over the past three decades, the Chinese government has led the country 
to an astonishing economic growth, and many citizens have benefited 
from it. The Chinese who travel overseas during this period are the 
rapidly rising middle class and the intelligentsia. When they see the 
good things in China being badmouthed in the western media, what else 
is this but hypocrisy? 
(Soong 14 September 2008) 
 
 
Echoing the opinion of many Chinese today, the essay then reiterated the desire 
of the Chinese people to live in a democratic China, but that a democratic 
system for China was not as important as the well-being of the Chinese people 
and the Chinese economy. Using the government actions (and the implied 
media reactions to them) of the USA in Iraq and of France and Great Britain in 
Africa as illustrations for his point, ‘300 Spartan Heroes’ argued that 
 
 
ultimately, the Chinese people want to achieve prosperity and national 
power through democratization. But the western media seem to only 
want democracy for the sake of democracy and they don’t care what 
happens to China afterwards. The Chinese form of democracy 
guarantees first and foremost the right to survive and develop. But the 
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western media wants to promote its own form of democracy according 
to its own ideas. They don’t care what happens to a country afterwards. 
(Soong 14 September 2008) 
 
 
The poster finished his essay with an appeal to the Western media ‘to keep up 
with the times’, in that the current levels of global travel between different 
countries meant that even in the media ‘truth should come first’ as lies would 
no longer be tolerated by people who have experienced the truth first-hand: 
‘The media ought to observe the basic rules – to report in an objective and fair 
manner. This is easier said than done for the western media.’ 
 
 
SOME CONCLUSIONS 
 
During the course of 2008, Chinese netizens demonstrated repeatedly that they 
are both media-savvy and active in their perusal of Western media reports on 
China (see the aggregator of links to Western news stories at the Back China 
site http://rss.backchina.com/eng/). However, they also showed great naivety in 
expecting Western media reports to comment on China in a positive manner, or 
to acknowledge China’s status in the world community. The combination of 
their expertise in accessing European and American news reports with these 
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naive beliefs caused them to be bitterly disappointed and enraged when unrests 
erupted in Tibet in March 2008, and Western media reports sided unanimously 
with the Tibetan people against China. 
 
 
While more aware of many of China’s problems, and engaged in almost 
constant criticism of Chinese officials at all levels of the country’s 
governmental structures, Chinese netizens are ultimately patriots and proud of 
China’s achievements over the past 30 years. They belong to the winners of the 
Chinese reforms since 1978, to the newly emerging middle-class and 
intelligentsia, who are enjoying unprecedented levels of freedom and comfort in 
today’s China. They were deeply hurt by the reporting style and the content of 
articles on China in the Western media, which they saw as malicious lies and 
fabrications published with the intention of stopping China’s rise in the global 
community. 
 
 
When they complain about unfair treatment on Western news sites, their 
complaints are ignored, belittled, made fun of, and become the basis for more 
criticism of China. They found that anything positive they wrote about China, 
and their posts defending China and its government, were treated as evidence of 
the success of the brainwashing techniques of the evil Communist government 
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in Beijing. Engagement was not wanted, only a ‘conversion’ to the Western 
point of view was acceptable to both Western media organisations, and 
Westerners leaving comments on blogs and news sites where Chinese netizens 
dare to raise their objections (Bianxiangqiao 2 August 2008; Branigan 23 
March 2008; Fassler 15 April 2008; Forney 13 April 2008; Jenne 27 March 
2008; Morford 21 March 2008). 
 
 
Western bloggers insulted Chinese netizens further by stating that they did not 
understand how Western media worked, that Western media was very diverse, 
that Western media was much better than Chinese media, that they had been 
brainwashed, and that they were too sensitive. Yet the vast majority of these 
Western ‘experts’ on China and its government could not read enough Chinese 
to access the Chinese Internet. The unfairness of the situation, and their own 
inability to convince Westerners that maybe they were wrong about China, 
caused many young Chinese to disassociate themselves from the West and 
Western ideas. 
 
 
The Olympics are over and slowly being forgotten, but for the relationship 
between China’s youth and the Western media little has changed. The rift and 
the disillusionment among young Chinese belonging to the increasingly vocal 
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and powerful middle-class and Chinese intelligentsia is a serious and dangerous 
development for China’s relationship with the rest of the world. 
 
 
After the end of the Olympic games, a disappointed Chinese netizen put his 
feelings into a poem that spread through Chinese cyberspace like a wild-fire 
(Soong 26 August 2008 for a translation). The poem is built around the idea 
that no matter what China does ‘there will always be someone’ who criticises 
China. Nothing China does is right or good. While the poem only mentions the 
Olympic Games, many of the commentators in Chinese cyberspace added lines 
about Chinese policies in general, giving the poem an even greater significance. 
 
 
The perceived behaviour of the Western media and Europe and America in 
general has disillusioned many of China’s netizens with the West. They have 
led to an attitude in Chinese Cyberspace that is very pro-China, and very 
supportive of the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party and the 
stability this rule brings. Chinese netizens are very much in favour of the 
continued economic development of China, and convinced that China does not 
need democracy or the rule of law. To silence its critics, it instead needs to 
grow much stronger, so that Europe and America will no longer dare to criticise 
it. Instead of an opening-up of China, it seems that Western reporting on China 
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during 2008 has provoked a circling of the wagons, and a strengthening of 
nationalist feelings coupled with a thorough distrust of the Western media and 
their message of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law that will be difficult 
to overcome. 
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